

Vol. 14 No 6 June 1989

Edited, printed and published at Liverpool
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 RATES for 1989, 10 issues (not August and September)
 SURFACE £9.50 UK, £10.50 Europe, \$(US)18.50 elsewhere
 AIR £10 Europe, \$(US)27.50 N.America, \$(US)35 Australasia.



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The Editor has returned to Liverpool after the sad family duty which took him away for over six weeks, and his first pleasant duty is to thank those two friends, one of them, it appears, a larger and fiercer dinosaur than ever he is, for getting out the May number of *LCM* in his absence. But even greater thanks are due to the Editorial Assistant, who, though content that her name should appear only at the head of the number, not only took charge of the office during that period but also acted for the Editor in all the other things he does in and around the University, but which need not be specified. He is very well aware that he is very far from being the easiest of men to work with, suffering as he does to an extreme degree from a syndrome identified by Thucydides (though he cannot immediately find the reference) 'that each man thought that where he was not doing the work, it was not being done'. But he is equally well aware that, without the EA, *LCM* and its associated enterprises, of which there are a great many and which effectively subsidise it, would revert to that unhappy state of affairs when he was trying to run it single-handed, and would inevitably collapse. It is then only proper, and long overdue, that on this occasion he should make public acknowledgement of all that he and it owe to her.

Another of the Editor's faults is what he calls 'premature anti-Fascism', the charge brought in 1939 against those who had supported the Spanish Government during the Spanish Civil War (and for an interesting sidelight on attitudes at the time he refers readers to the end of R.G.Collingwood's autobiography). He is aware that his advocacy of the concentration of classical studies into a few large departments excited a great deal of hostility: yet such voluntary reorganisation would surely have been preferable to what has been and is being forced upon us. More recently he announced his intention of publishing a definitive list of the results of the recent closures and moves, only to receive a letter from the Classical Association and CUCD saying that they were going to publish an updated version of their directory, and asking him to forward any information he received. Departments have presumably by now received a communication themselves from one or other of these bodies, but if they have not, he asks them to send directly to them the information for which he asked.

It was also as far back as 1963, even before Shirley Williams, that, in an article, *The five term year and other changes*, in *Sphinx*, a Liverpool student journal, he advocated the two-year degree, and its concomitant, the continuous University (though only five eight week terms, 40 weeks out of the 52). Now he reads that the idea has reappeared as one of the first suggestions of the new Universities Funding Council which has taken the place of the old University Grants Committee, always represented as a salutary buffer between government and universities. What else it will recommend is not yet clear, but there are fears that it will firmly separate teaching and research, and that support for both will have to be bid for by Universities on the basis of cost as well as effectiveness, something that will penalise those Departments with a high proportion of elderly and expensive staff, who will therefore be pressured, if they have not already, to take early retirement. He notes that the Historical Association has already pointed to the existence of Departments of History with hardly anybody over or under their 40s.

His argument in 1963 was based on the experience that very many students were effectively being taught and studying only from October to June, with two months off in the middle: what he failed to allow for was the additional maturity acquired by students in three years, at the end of which they may well be better than at the end of two. For this is also the season of A-Level marking, which always leads him to reflect on the quality and knowledge of candidates, and his current thinking, based on the experience of some Departments, is that we should perhaps accept that the sort of linguistic competence which we claim for ourselves will never be, and perhaps never was, general among students; that it is not our sole business to train classical scholars and that the habits of scholarly thinking which we do want to inculcate can as well be acquired through classical studies and ancient history without the languages; that we should require all students to take one year of Latin and/or Greek simply to identify those who have a gift and whom it is worth diverting into a rigorous course of almost exclusively linguistic classics.

The Editor's approaching retirement means that he is not likely to be in a position to put any of these ideas into practice. But he intends that *LCM* shall remain, as he wishes that the CUCD conference might become, a place where these and other ideas can be discussed, and not by himself alone, as well as a place in which the products of individual even if unpopular research may be published. For it is upon individual research that Arts disciplines depend, and he very much hopes that those bodies who are in a position to do so will continue to urge upon our paymasters that Arts research flourishes best in freedom and should not be forced into modes perhaps more appropriate for the sciences, with their long tradition of collaborative work and where the sums of money involved are considerably greater.

What Jasper Griffin had to say in his obituary (in the *Independent*) of Russell Meiggs is not without relevance to the previous paragraph. 'His death' (on the 24th June, aged 86), he said, 'is felt as the end of an era, the age in which a first-class scholar could devote himself to the career of an Oxford tutor, without seeking further promotion, and seeing no contradiction between a heavy teaching load and the highest standards of research'. Russell Meiggs should be an example to us all, and not least to the Editor, who hopes that he will not be one of those (once more to quote Jasper Griffin) 'who find it is now too late to produce the books which their teaching career has postponed'.

Equally relevant to the Editor's remarks on research is the account he has received of a new journal, *Syllecta Classica*, to be published this fall by the Department of Classics, 112 Schaeffer Hall, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IO 52242, at \$15 for individuals, \$30 for libraries and institutions (is *LCM* naive in continuing to have but one rate?). For the general philosophy of the journal is to give preference to interdisciplinary research and to research so radically different that it is unlikely to appear elsewhere (except, the Editor would hope, in the ever-hospitable pages of *LCM*). But *Syllecta Classica* (unlike *LCM*) has rules which the Editor reproduces for the benefit of intending contributors, who 'should send two copies of the manuscript. Copy must be no longer than 30 pages, typed, double-spaced on 8 1/2 x 11 sheets [this is smaller than the A4 almost universal now in UK], and exhibit standard formatting [which

probably means more to American contributors than it does to the Editor]. References should appear at the end'.


The Editor's comments should not be taken to mean that he does not welcome the appearance of a new, different, and more professional journal, with which he hopes to institute an exchange. He is not yet so dinosaurian as not to approve the emergence of mammals, while hoping that he may continue to flourish in his own ecological niche, suitably chastened by the emergence of a new dominant species.

The other dinosaur has brought to the Editor's attention the following passage, which he appends to these notes.



'they are all taken up; with the conduct of some wheel in the complex machinery of cram, which grinds down all special tendencies and tastes into once uniform mediocrity. The men of middle age seem, after they reach thirty-five or forty, to be struck with an intellectual palsy, and betake themselves, no longer to port, but to the frippery work of attending boards and negotiating some phantom of legislation, with all the importance of a cabinet council – *belli simulacra cientes*. Then they give each other dinners, where they assemble again with the comfortable assurance that they have earned their evening relaxation by the fatigues of the morning's committee. These are the leading men of our university, and who give the tone to it – a tone as of a lively municipal borough; all objects of science and learning, for which a university exists, being put out of sight by the consideration of the material means of endowing them'.

So a commentator in 1883 on a certain English tertiary institution.
Plus ça change . . .



B.Boyaval (Lille): SB XII, 11188, O.Tait II, 1048, P.IFAO III, 31

LCM 14.6(Jun.1989), 83-85

1. SB III.11188

Sous cette référence figure une étiquette de momie grecque d'Egypte, initialement publiée par O.O.Krüger et G.Bistrikova, VDI 92 (1965), p.104 et pl.II verso:

Ψενσέπνα (?) Βουρύος
Παχουμίον ἀπό Ψιν-
πελώχ(εως)

Lors de son insertion au *Sammelbuch*, 'Ψενσέπνα (?)' est devenu 'Ψενσενπᾶ (?)'. Mais la photographie du *VDI* est trop trouble (écriture effacée) pour que nous puissions choisir: Πνᾶς et Πᾶς sont tous deux attestés (*Namenbuch* col.281 et 334: *Onomasticon alterum papyrologicum* p.236 et 262¹.

L.2, en revanche, la photo invite à abandonner Παχουμίον: au lieu d'*αχ*, on voit *εκ*; quant au *μι*, il est traversé verticalement par un *sigma* carré. On peut donc hésiter entre Πεκουμίον et Πεκουσίον, tous deux inconnus du *Namenbuch* et de l'*Onomasticon*: *Πεκούμιος² ne serait pas impossible, car l'alternance Πα-/Πε- est fréquent dans les transcriptions phonétiques grecques du déterminatif masculin égyptien (ex. Πακῦσις/Πεκῦσις dans le *Namenbuch* col.259), ainsi que la désaspiration κ pour χ (ex. Παχόμις/Πακόμις, Παχῦμις/Πακύμις dans le *Namenbuch*.259): *Πεκούσιος n'est pas irrecevable non plus, à côté du banal Πεκύσιος (*Namenbuch* col.301; *Onomasticon* p.246); on pourrait imaginer un couple Πεκούσιος/Πεκύσιος, parallèlement à Παχούμιος/Παχύμιος (*Namenbuch* col.259).

¹ Aucune explication n'est donnée en note à ce changement, si bien qu'on ne peut dire s'il est volontaire ou simplement dû à une faute d'imprimerie.

² Selon l'usage des philologues, nous ajoutons l'astérisque des formes non attestées mais reconstituables.

2.O. Tait II, 1048

La l.1 de cet ostracon porte le prescrit épistolaire suivant:

[.] ν καὶ Πακοῖβι(σ) μέτοχ(ος) Ζώ[λωι χαῖ(ρειν)]

En note, ses éditeurs ont avancé une hypothèse: 'Dans la lacune, restituer τελ(ώνης) (?); ν désigne peut-être un octroi, dû par un transporteur'. Confirmée, elle ferait de ce tesson un témoin de plus dans la littérature douanière de l'Egypte romaine, car ν, avec ou sans tiret horizontal superposé, est l'abréviation courante de la pentekostè. En sa faveur, on ne peut invoquer que les cas où cette taxe apparaît seule, sans précision géographique, ex. O.Tait II, 1089-1093 (ailleurs figure le nom de la ville ou du nome de perception, ν Ἐρμανθίτου sur W.O.II, 801, 806, O.Tait II, 1087; ν Τωάτ sur O.Tait II, 1083-1085).

Contre elle, il y a un argument de taille: quel que soit le prescrit (schéma presque universel δ δεῖνα καὶ οἱ μέτοχοι τῷ δεῖνι χαῖρειν ou schéma rarissime δ δεῖνα καὶ δ δεῖνα μέτοχος τῷ δεῖνι χαῖρειν, qui figure ici et sur quelques parallèles, O.Tait I, 745, W.O.II, 1049), quand le mot τελώνης ou une autre désignation de fonction³ accompagne le mot μέτοχος, 3. Ex. O.Tait I, 745, où on lit Πικᾶς καὶ μ(έτοχος) Παχνοῦμ(ις) ἀπαιτ(ηται) μερισμ(οῦ) πλινθ(ον). il lui est toujours postposé (ex. W.O.II, 801, 806; O.Tait II, 1082, 1084, 1086, 1087, c 140). Si ν désignait ici la pentekostè, on attendrait donc l'ordre des mots [x] καὶ Πακοῖβι(σ) μέτοχ(ος) τελ(ώναι) ν Ζώ[λωι χαῖ(ρειν)].

Dans se *Customs duties in graeco-roman Egypt* (1987), p.198, P.J.Sijpesteijn ne mentionne pas cet ostracon. Il ne l'a donc pas retenu parmi les témoignages de la littérature douanière, sans doute avec raison. Car une autre lecture fournit une solution plus vraisemblable: ν, avec ou sans tiret conjoint, peut être aussi une abréviation courante de ν(εώτερος), ex. O.Tait II, 1102, 1154, 1155, 1163 etc. On peut lire ici [δ δεῖνα] ν(εώτερος) καὶ Πακοῖβι(σ) μέτοχ(ος) Ζώ[λωι χαῖ(ρειν)].

3.P.IFAO III, 31

Voici le texte proposé o.1. p 36-37 de ce contrat de location de terre:

Ἔτους ἔκτου Αύτοκράτορος μηνὸς ἐν Τεβτόνι τοῦ Ἀρσενοείτου νομοῦ. τοῦ δεῖνος ὡς ἔτῶν]Καίσαρος Οέσ(πασι)ανοῦ Σε(βασ)τοῦ []τῆς Πολ[έ]μω[ν]ος μερίδος Ομολογεῖ Ήράδη[τ]εσσεράκοντα ἐξ οὐλ[ή]]Οννώφρι πετεσούχ[ον ιούλη πήχει δριστερῷ[ὡς ἔτῶν μεμισθω]κένται αὐτῶν Όννώφρι εἴ[τε τὸ εἰσιδόν] ἔβδομον ἔτος Αύτοκράτορος Καίσαρος Ούεσπασι]ανοῦ Σεβαστοῦ ἀφ' ὧν γεωργ[ε]ΐ [δ αὐτὸς 5 Ήράδη[σ περὶ τὴν προκειμένην Τεβτ[ύνιν δημοσί[ων ἔδαφῶν τὰς ἐν δυσὶ σφ[ραγίσι βασιλικ]ῆς γῆς ἀρούρας τρεῖς ἡ δσαι ἔα[ν ὡσι τῆς πρώτης σφραγεῖδος ἀρούρα[ς δύο]..[]. κτο.[
10 Η]ρακλ[ε]ίωι ἐλαιουργῷ δευτέρ[ῳ] ἡ δέ λοιπῇ δρ[ο]νυρα μία προσγειτνιῶσα ἐ[κ] τοῦ πρὸς βορρᾶ μέρους Ἀγχιοῦτι Ἀγχιοῦτος. τὰς δὲ ἀρούρας τρεῖς εἰς σποράν χόρτου κα[ὶ] κοπῆν κ[αὶ] ἔη- ρασίαν. [τῆς τῶν [σ]περμάτων χορηγίας οὖσης 15 πρὸς] τ[ὸν] Όννώφ[ρο]ν τῷ δὲ σπέρμα[τα	
20	

3. Ex. O.Tait I, 745, où on lit Πικᾶς καὶ μ(έτοχος) Παχνοῦμ(ις) ἀπαιτ(ηται) μερισμ(οῦ) πλινθ(ον).

].τις γεωργίας ψῆπι μητ.[
]τῶν πρὸς τὸν δμολογοῦμ[τα
 Ήράδη[ς] ἔχι παρὰ τοῦ Ὄννώφριος .[
 τ]ὴν τ[ου] χόρτου τειμήν πᾶσαν[
 25]. . διαχειρ[ὸς] ἐξ οἰκου .. [
]. . . ν καὶ τοὺς παρ' [αὐτοῦ
 Ὄννώφρι καὶ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰς προβεβαίμενας
]βεβαίωσι[
]. . . [
]

Son contenu a été résumé ainsi, p.37: 'Hérôdès reconnaît avoir loué à Onnôphris, fils de Pétesouchos, l'an 7 de Vespasien, 3 aroures de terre royale en deux lots, afin qu'ils soient ensemencés en verdure que l'on coupera et fera sécher. Cette terre se trouve dans les environs de Tebtynis'.

Ligne 1 – Il y a sûrement lieu de supprimer le crochet droit final; il donne à supposer une lacune qui n'a probablement jamais existé. Grâce aux 1.2-3, qui nous fournissent la définition administrative complète de Tebtynis ('à Tebtynis dans le district de Polémon du nome Arsinoïte'), nous savons que la partie conservée des 1.4-6 n'excédait pas 20 lettres: on en compte 19 en 2, 17-18 en 4-6 et la 1.3, qui n'a gardé que 13 lettres, a dû porter, en plus, le début du patronyme d'Hérôdès, à son extrémité. Les 21 lettres actuellement conservées de la 1.1 sont donc certainement un maximum, ce que deux autres arguments, de formulaire⁴ et d'écriture⁵, paraissent confirmer.

Ligne 22 – L'édition originale propose:]τῶν πρὸς τὸν δμολογοῦμ[τα

Les 1.19-20 énonçaient les servitudes juridiques incombant à Onnôphris: [τ]ῆς τῶν [σ]περμάτων χορη[γίας οὐσης πρὸς] τ[ὸν] Ὄννώφρ[ο]ι ν, l'énoncé des servitudes juridiques imcombant à Hérôdès devait suivre. Il parait donc nécessaire de restituer δν]τῶν πρὸς τὸν δμολογοῦμ[τα.

Lignes 23-24 – L'édition originale propose:

Ήράδη[ς] ἔχι παρὰ τοῦ Ὄννώφριος.[
 τ]ὴν τ[οῦ] χόρτου τειμήν πᾶσαν[
]

A la conclusion du contrat, le propriétaire (Hérôdès) a reçu une somme du locataire (Onnophris). Il y a eu paiement anticipé. Les parallèles nous invitent à supposer la séquence τν προδόματι ou une variante à la fin de la 1.23 et au début de la 1.24.

Ligne 26 – L'édition originale propose:]. . . ν καὶ τοὺς παρ' [αὐτοῦ

Les mêmes raisons de parallélisme qu'aux 1.19-20 et 22 nous amènent à proposer]Ηράδην καὶ τοὺς παρ' [αὐτοῦ, puisqu'on lit à la ligne suivante Ὄννώφρι καὶ τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ

Ligne 28 – Le papyrus a subi une légère mutilation depuis 1967. Une photographie d'alors (cliché J.Marthalot) montre que la 1.28 portait]βεβαίωσι ἀπό⁶

A titre d'exemple, on pourrait suggérer ici ἀπὸ [δημοσίων καὶ παντὸς εἴδους].

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⁴ On peut raisonnablement supposer que le scribe ait utilisé la même titulature impériale aux 1.1 et 8-9.

⁵ C'est pour placer toute la titulature impériale sur la 1.1, qu'il a recouru à deux abréviations intérieures. Or, sans être rare, ce procédé n'est pas usuel et sa répétition, deux fois de suite, est d'autant surprenante.

⁶ Ex. BGU 227, 20 : βεβαιώσεις δέ μοι ἀπὸ δημοσίων πάντων καὶ παντὸς εἴδους

SB I, 5245, 15: βεβαιώσομέν σοι ταῦτα ἀπὸ τε συγγραφῶν πασῶν καὶ συναλλαγμάτων πάντων καὶ παντὸς εἴδους.

Douglas L.Cairns (Otago): *Problems in Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*

LCM 14.6 (Jun.1989), 86-89

On pp. 168-77 of his book *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action* (London, 1984) David Charles applies his interpretation of Aristotle's desire-based theory of motivation to the distinction between a) *ἀνδρεῖα* and *δειλία* and b) *σωφροσύνη, ἔγκρατεια, ἀκρασία*, and *ἀκολασία* as states of character. He rightly dismisses the superficial problem, that courage looks like a virtue of self-control; this, in fact, is no problem at all - the brave man will feel fear, and the *σώφρων* will not be insensitive to pleasure, but each will act for the sake of the noble, coping with the relevant desire or emotion in precisely the right way as suggested by the doctrine of the mean. Charles' account rightly goes deeper than this, and detects important similarities and differences between the complex of states based on fear and that based on pleasure.

Charles' conclusion in this section is that the various states of character in the hierarchy from virtue to vice are distinguished each from the other by the degree of pleasure or pain actually or hypothetically experienced by the agent when faced with the choice between noble or ignoble action; this seems securely based on Aristotle's text, since at *EN* 1104b 4-11 he writes that in appraising character we must look not only at the act but at the pleasure or pain experienced by the agent. Charles, however, draws further conclusions from this passage, to the effect that overall pain (real or hypothetical) in performing a noble action is a sufficient (and necessary?) condition for vice. He then goes on to distinguish (pp. 171-4) between possible responses to fear and possible responses to pleasure on this basis; in dealing with pleasure (the sphere of *σωφροσύνη* etc.) one can fail to be fully virtuous without being fully vicious, since strong desire for an alternative goal (in the cases of *ἔγκρατεια* and *ἀκρασία*) does not presuppose real or hypothetical pain in acting nobly, but only overall pleasure in acting contrary to one's best judgment; in dealing with fear, however, one is dealing with the direct onset of pain; to desire the alternative goal ('the countergoal') of safety over the noble action is to find the latter painful overall, and overall pain indicates vice.

Thus Charles prints the following hierarchical table of states (p. 173):

<i>Courage</i>	<i>Temperance</i>
(a) <i>Courageous man</i> : he resists because it is noble without pain overall, having successfully overcome his fear.	(a) <i>Temperate man</i> : he abstains because it is noble with pleasure overall, having successfully overcome his sensual desire.
(b) <i>First failure</i> : he resists because it is noble, but does so with pain overall, because he has not successfully overcome his fear (1104b7-8).	(b) <i>First failure</i> (self control): he abstains because it is noble without pain overall, but would enjoy overall acting against his best judgment - and hence has not completely overcome his sensual desire.
(c) <i>Second failure</i> : the man who does not resist although he judges this the noble course, but flees because he is overcome by fear.	(c) <i>Second failure (acrasia)</i> : he judges it better to abstain but indulges in sensual pleasure against his better judgment under the influence of excessive desire.
(d) <i>Third failure</i> : the man who judges it best to flee because he has excessive fear.	(d) <i>Third failure</i> (self-indulgent 1): he abstains because he judges it noble but does so with pain overall because he has not successfully overcome his sensual desire (1104b6-7).

(e) *Fourth failure* (self-indulgent 2):
he judges it best to indulge his
appetite, and does so without qualms

In the case of courage all states from (b) onwards are cowardly, whereas in the case of *σωφροσύνη* only (d) and (e) are positively vicious; there are thus no analogues, according to Charles, to the states of *έγκράτεια* and *δκρασία* in dealing with fear, and this is because desire for the countergoal in the case of fear involves overall pain at acting nobly, overall pain being sufficient for vice.

It will be seen that position (b) in the scale of courage is thus analogous not to its counterpart in the corresponding scale of *σωφροσύνη*, but to position (d), and indeed, both these types are described in the same passage of the *EN*. It is in the interpretation of this passage, I believe, that Charles goes wrong.

Charles comments that, on his interpretation of Aristotle's theory, there arises the paradox that 'the agent who resists the enemy with pain overall (i.e. [b]) [is] cowardly - even though he may on occasion stay and fight in just the same way as the courageous man' (p. 176). 'And this', comments Charles, 'seems to be mistaken'.

This does sound paradoxical; but a more striking paradox, perhaps, to any reader of Aristotle is the claim that a vicious person, an *ἀκόλαστος* or a *δειλός*, can actually perform a noble action for the sake of the noble. Charles' evidence for this comes from the crucial passage, *EN* 1104b4-11, on pleasure and pain. Now, if Charles believes that this passage mentions an *ἀκόλαστος* and a *δειλός* who act for the sake of the noble but with pain overall, he is simply mistaken, for the relevant lines read:

δ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἤδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ
χαίρων σώφρων, δ ὁ ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ δ μὲν ὑπομένων
τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ή μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος,
δ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός (1104b5-8).

There is no mention here of the resistance of the *ἀκόλαστος* or the endurance of the *δειλός* being motivated by a noble best judgment; both these types simply perform the requisite action with pain overall; if these vicious types who actually act in the same way as the virtuous are to have the same motivational structure as other vicious types who perform the ignoble action, then it is on the face of it much more likely that they should be imagined as actually desiring to do the ignoble action, but being prevented from doing it, perhaps by means of external sanctions. One might compare the *ἀκόλαστος* at 1119a1-5, who, led on by his desires, chooses (*αἱρεῖσθαι*) their objects, and feels pain both when he fails to achieve his aim and when he is afflicted by desire. Such a person surely is vicious, and it is not all paradoxical that he should not be considered virtuous simply because, by an accident of circumstance, he is prevented from following his inclination and is forced to act in the same way as the virtuous person.

Charles probably wishes to claim, however, that the passage commits Aristotle to the belief that anyone who is grieved by abstention or endurance is vicious, that overall pain is sufficient for vice in any circumstances - certainly where the agent is prevented from performing the ignoble action he really wants to perform, but also in cases in which the agent acts for the sake of the noble. But Aristotle should only be held to such a view if it harmonizes with his account as a whole, and this it manifestly does not.

At *EN* 1110b31-33 it is stated that neither ignorance in the *προαἴρεσις* nor general ignorance renders an action involuntary; both these terms refer to deliberate appetition of the wrong or bad end in the belief that it is the ultimate good, and both are culpable, both indicate defects of character. And this is Aristotle's normal position with regard to the worst or vicious state of character - the vicious person deliberately pursues the wrong end, he has the wrong *προαἴρεσις* (e. g. 1134a24-5, 1150a19-23, b29). At 1146b22-4, 1148a13-17, 1151a5-7, 1152a3-6, and 1152a15-24 the *ἀκρατής* and the *ἀκόλαστος* are distinguished by the fact that the former does not, while the latter does believe that it is right to pursue pleasure; vice is *κατὰ προαἴρεσιν, δκρασία* is *παρὰ προαἴρεσιν* (1151a5-7; cf. 1148a17). These two types, then, are distinguished by their beliefs, not simply by the influence of pleasure or pain on their motivational structures.

So Charles' dubious interpretation of 1104b5-8 leads him to place undue emphasis on affective and appetitive factors to the exclusion of evaluative factors in distinguishing between states. Another of the central passages which he adduces in support of his interpretation actually underlines its falsity. On pp. 171-2 he considers *EN* 1150a25-31, a passage which does,

as he says, hold that pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of the pain of abstaining from pleasure are not always the same thing; this Charles takes to be support for his view that Aristotle regards overall pain in pursuing the goal set by the noble as distinct from overall pleasure in pursuing the countergoal, the one being a sufficient condition for out-and-out vice, the other not. The distinction between pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of the pain of frustration is certainly there, but crucially Aristotle does not, as Charles says he does, use it to distinguish between the *άκολαστος* and the *άκρατής*. The passage reads:

τῶν δὲ μὴ προαιρούμενων διὰ μὲν ἀγεταὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν, διὸ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν λύπην τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥστε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. παντὶ δὲ ἀν δόξειε χειρῶν εἶναι εἰ τις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν ή ἡρέμα πράττοι τι αἰσχρόν, ή εἰ σφόδρα ἐπιθυμῶν, καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι ή εἰ ὀργιζόμενος· τι γὰρ ἀν ἐποιεῖ ἐν πάθει ᾧν; διὸ δὲ ἀκόλαστος χειρῶν τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ.

According to Charles this passage distinguishes between the *άκρατής* who acts against his best judgment because he finds another course of action more pleasant overall and the *άκολαστος* who would act against a temperate best judgment because of his overall pain in acting temperately. But the distinction between pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain is applied to *οἱ μὴ προαιρούμενοι* alone, and this class cannot include the *άκολαστος*, since it is he who is described in the preceding sentence (a23-5) as 'the one who avoids physical pains not because he is overcome by them but *διὰ προαιρεσίου*' (cf. a19-21). The passage does go on to distinguish between the *άκρατής* and the *άκολαστος*, but the crucial sentence for Charles' account is not concerned with this distinction at all. (Burnet, ad loc., comments 'διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, sc. *οἱ προαιρούμενοι καὶ οἱ μὴ*'. The difference is explained in *παντὶ δὲ ἀν δόξειε κτλ'* but it is difficult to see how a distinction between two types who do not choose can have as a consequence [ώστε] a distinction between those who choose and those who do not; Thomson's translation [Penguin, revised 1976] follows Burnet, but those of Ross and Irwin [Indianapolis, 1985] relate the consecutive clause to the two types of *οἱ μὴ προαιρούμενοι*.)

Charles (p. 171) refers to 1166b18ff. as support for his assumption that an *άκολαστος* can have a temperate best judgment. This is certainly a contentious passage, since on the surface it describes the vicious person in terms which suggest that he undergoes the same kind of inner conflict as does the *άκρατής*. Here, in the context of *φιλαντία* Aristotle denies the vicious the proper kind of self-love which may be experienced by the good; the many, who are *φαῦλοι*, can approve of themselves and consider themselves decent (1166b3-4), but they cannot be at peace with themselves as the *σπουδαῖος* can, since their personalities are divided - like *οἱ ἀκρατεῖς* (b8) they have an *ἐπιθυμία* for one thing and a *βούλησις* for another (b7-8); there is *στάσις* in their souls, one part, because of their *μοχθηρίᾳ*, being pained at abstention, another being pleased (b19-21, Charles' passage); such a person becomes distressed that he was pleased, and wishes he had not found certain things pleasant, for *φαῦλοι* are full of regret (b23-5).

Here it certainly looks as though these worthless people are divided and experience regret because their appetites conflict with their reason, yet at 1150a 21-2, b29-30 the *άκολαστος* is specifically said not to experience regret, but to abide by his *προαιρεσίς*; thus he is incurable (b32). In what way, then, does the *βούλησις* of the *φαῦλος* conflict with his desires? Not in the Platonic sense that *βούλησις* strictly speaking is wish for the (true) good; although Aristotle does accommodate this view (1113a15-b2), he clearly does not believe that those who wish not for the good but for that which seems good to them retain a true *βούλησις* for the true good – their *βούλησις*, which remains a *βούλησις*, though not in the strict and truest sense, is for the apparent good, which, in the many, is generally pleasure (1113a33-b1); such people have no wish for the true good at all.

Yet this passage is still the clue to the correct interpretation of 1166b2-26; in the latter passage Aristotle is scrupulous in stressing that the wish of the *φαῦλοι* which conflicts with their appetite is directed at that which seems good to them; they choose harmful pleasures *ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἔαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι* (1166b8-10), or else, out of cowardice and laziness, they shrink from doing *δὲ οὖνται ἔαυτοῖς βέλτιστα εἶναι* (b10-11). It is from pursuit of their *particular* aims that these people are distracted by desire, not from pursuit of the true good; their viciousness gets in the way of their rational pursuit of their existing vicious ends, and after the fact they regret that the approach of a supervenient desire caused them to act contrary to their normal plan. (Cf. Irwin, notes to translation, ad loc.; there remains the slight inconcinnity

that vicious people are said to experience regret here but not to do so at 1150a 21-2, b29-30, but Irwin's interpretation allows us to see their lack of regret at not being truly good as concerning a situation completely distinct from that of their regret at failing in their rational plan to achieve their [established] vicious aims. Gauthier-Jolif follow Stewart in regarding the *φαῦλοι* of this passage as *ἀκρατεῖς*, notwithstanding *μοχθητία* in b20, but differ from him in regarding the initial use of *φαῦλοι* in the passage at b3 as referring to the vicious; Irwin's interpretation is truer to the text than that of Stewart/Gauthier-Jolif, but either is sufficient for my purposes here, as both see that this one passage would set up an insupportable contradiction with a considerable body of passages elsewhere in the *EN* if it were supposed to mean that a vicious person could retain a virtuous best judgment. The contradiction is upheld by Grant, and even if we were to follow him, we should surely have to give greater weight to the view that occurs more regularly, as being more indicative of Aristotle's considered opinion. J. Annas, *Mind* 1977, 554 [cf. 541] also refuses to attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction, regarding it as possible evidence for the incorporation of an earlier account of friendship in the later *EN*; again, the passage would still not be evidence for Aristotle's overall view.)

All this should be enough to show that Aristotle typically regards the vicious person as one who acts deliberately, as a result of a wrong *προαίρεσις*. No doubt Charles would argue that the judgment that the vicious action is the best course may be sufficient, but not necessary for vice, but this position would entail a denial of the obvious import of V. 8, especially 1136a1-5: mere voluntary action is not sufficient for possession of the states of injustice or justice – *προαίρεσις* is necessary for both; without *προαίρεσις* one merely commits (un)just acts, one is not oneself (un)just. Admittedly, there are anomalies in the account of justice in Book V, but in this particular matter its pronouncements are entirely consonant with the rest of the *EN*. Cf. the account of states which resemble courage at 1116a15-1117a28; the distinguishing factor which separates the five approximations to courage enumerated here from courage proper is that the true *δύσπειος* does, whereas the man of civic courage etc. do not, resist for the sake of the noble - the man of civic courage resists for the sake of something noble, namely honour (1116a28-9), but not for the sake of the noble itself. By contrast, the only evidence Charles can adduce in favour of the proposition that *προαίρεσις* is sufficient but not necessary for vice is 1104b5-8.

It seems impossible, then, that the vicious person could have a virtuous best judgment; the virtuous best judgment is reserved for those who are virtuous, or for those who would be if they could control their appetites and emotions. Thus the section of Charles' book under discussion (at least) is seriously vitiated; the crucial inference, that overall pain in acting nobly is sufficient for vice, rests entirely on illegitimate use of 1104b5-8, yet it is repeatedly invoked at this point of the account (pp. 169, 171, 173, 174); as a result, Charles' thesis that Aristotle's criteria for distinguishing between states of character are exclusively desire-based is untenable.

Since stage (b) on Charles' scale of courage corresponds to stage (d) on his scale of *σωφροσύνη*, the possibility remains that analogues to *έγκράτεια* and *ἀκρασία* might be possible in dealing with the emotion of fear; certainly Aristotle says quite plainly that these terms are strictly applied only to 'the same things as *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία*' (1148b11-12), but he does not explicitly rule out an application to fear (as Charles' n. 8, p. 171, might suggest), and other cases are allowed by analogy (1147b34-5, 1148b12-13). Since, then, the type described in stage (b) of Charles' hierarchy of courage cannot be an *ἀκόλαστος*, the possibility remains that he is an *έγκρατής*; and since overall pain at acting for the sake of the noble is not the criterion of vice, Charles' second failure (c) on the scale of courage could be *ἀκρατής*; the type which is really described in 1104b7-8, the *δειλός* who, for whatever reason, cannot execute his resolve to flee, would then occupy position (d), leaving position (e) free for the coward who judges it best to flee and does so; the hierarchy of courage would thus be exactly analogous to that of *σωφροσύνη*, although perhaps Aristotle himself would not have attached much importance to the construction of such an analogy, given that he restricts *έγκράτεια* and *ἀκολασία* proper to the same sphere as *σωφροσύνη*.

REVIEW: Gillian Clark (Liverpool)

LCM 14.6 (Jun.1989), 90-91

Aline Rousselle, *PORNEIA: On desire and the body in antiquity*. Blackwell 1988, tr. Felicia Pheasant. £19.95, cased; pp.x + 213 . ISBN 0-631-13837-4.

Rousselle's book has been much cited since its appearance in 1983. It is good to have an English version which makes up in precision for an occasional loss of drama and metaphor (and a very occasional oddity, 'the Hippocratic Collection', 'Augustus's caducous laws'). And perhaps it is easier to assess Rousselle's contribution now that several other works on late antique self-awareness provide a contrast with her method. Some of these are the subject of an important review by Averil Cameron in *JRS* 96 (1986) 266-71, which juxtaposes R. with Veyne and Foucault on the increased concern with 'private' morality and sexual self-control that all three detect in both Christian and non-Christian writing. Peter Brown, *The Body and Sexuality*, 1988, has now joined the list of recent publications.

The topic fascinates those who have experienced the collapse, and partial reconstruction, of traditional arguments for chastity. Why, in the C3-4 AD, should the way of Christian perfection be not just chastity but virginity, and not just virginity but sensual deprivation, in solitary or communal ascetic life? Why should *porneia* come to mean not the practice of fornication but the mere experience of sexual desire? E.R. Dodds' classic response, *Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety* (1965), was given long enough ago for a recent volume of reassessment (*Pagan and Christian Anxiety*, ed. R.C. Smith and J. Lounibos, 1984), which serves chiefly to show the merits of Dodds. R. has something in common with Dodds, but where he looks at the overall historical and social setting, she looks at ordinary social behaviour.

The special merit of R.'s book is documentation. She focusses on the medical texts which reveal what doctors and their patients counted as good health, proper sexual functioning, correct care for babies; on the laws which set out to regulate sexual conduct; and on conditions of life for the Egyptian peasant farmers from whom the desert monks came. The great adventure of this is that we learn something about life for those outside the elite which read moral philosophers, or the much wider audience which heard Christian sermons.

R.'s thesis is allusively presented and dispersed through the book. Bluntly stated, it is that Egyptian monasticism (solitary or communal) of the C3-4 was a sensible response to economic exploitation which left too little land. The monastic diet, adapted from that of the fellahin, drew on the observed effects of famine (impotence in men, amenorrhea in women) to minimise sexual desire. The real puzzle is why this lifestyle appealed to men and women of the Roman governing elite. The answer is that the women, married too young and sexually unsatisfied, were prepared to choose continence when they could, or to see their children do so. The men, wary of the debilitating effect of sexual activity, and marrying only for heirs, had shared with the women an upbringing designed to produce obedience and to control desire. So the 'overachievers', to use Robin Lane Fox's useful term (*Pagans and Christians*, 1986), followed the Egyptian example.

R.'s argument rests on some bizarrely interesting material. Here, for instance, is Julian's doctor Oribasius, collecting medical advice for the overworked public men of the later Roman empire. They had no time to take proper sleep or exercise (except in so far as declamation is exercise if you attend to breath-control) and failed to restore the body's moisture, depleted by public speaking, at the baths. They could at least watch their diet (no heavy foods) and their sex-lives. Sex made them tired and depleted their vital spirit yet further, but diet could help. Cooling foods (lettuce, courgettes, melon) favour abstinence, chick-peas are aphrodisiac. (A small local poll suggests that these results are no longer observable.) Some doctors declared that men who abstain from sex are taller and stronger than those who do not. The overall aim was to achieve good sperm for the act of intercourse which would produce a child – and many of the recommendations are still fashionable in infertility clinics. (*Harper's and Queen's*, February 1989.)

Medical advice, given the presuppositions of Galen and Soranus (detailed by R.) on the

formation of semen, was sensible enough. R. deals also with cult-practices variously concerned with fertility and its absence, on the grounds that they occupied the collective imagination. So she is characteristically informative (ch. 7) on how to practice self-castration (sometimes equivalent only to vasectomy) or to sacrifice a baby – a horror which, she thinks, continued in Carthage until the early empire, and even after it was banned had such a grip on the imagination that Christians were accused of doing it.

The legal material is less sensational, except for the legalised rape of under-12s. The effects most strongly emphasised by R. are that women (unless in the category of 'those on whom *stuprum* is not committed') could not safely have casual affairs, and that they could be deserted once they had produced necessary heirs, unable, without legal risk, to form a new relationship. Men were of course freer, but R. detects their anxiety in the jurists' responses on what does or does not constitute a legal relationship: the criminalisation of adultery added to the time-honoured perils.

The problem for the reader of all this fascinating stuff is R.'s generalisations. Take ch. 2, on the bodies of women. R. reads the Hippocratic texts as a record of what women experienced, discussed with one another, and worked out as remedies, especially for infertility. This is an agreeable thought, impossible to prove or disprove. Later Roman medical texts, by contrast, she takes to show doctors acting together with fathers to prepare women for young but fertile marriage, and – between the lines – these women struggling to regain control of their bodies, defending themselves against loss of looks and further pregnancies. Again, she may be right. But the chapter ends (p. 46) with the devastating assertion, 'As for the children brought into the world by these women, it was recognised throughout the Mediterranean world that their mothers cared very little for them'. The reference is to Soranus, *Gynaecology* 2.44, which does not support the general claim. What Soranus says, in one of his engaging Greek chauvinist moods, is that the incidence of rickets at Rome relates to silly mothers trying to make their babies walk too early. We do not know what social class he has in mind (the children of the tenements?) and have no hope of tracing the motives of their caregivers – quite possibly foolish pride in their charges' progress.

The chapter which follows, on the bodies of children, ends with another large-scale suggestion (p. 62). 'While the Greeks, or at least the physician Athenaeus, sought to make a young man able to control himself, the medical profession which served the Roman nobility used its knowledge to impose restraints on the child as soon as he was conceived, if not before. Happiness was not a factor to be considered . . . The bands which imprisoned the young child might be the one thing which, all his life, would bring him back to thought as the source of truth'. This may be a correct claim about the psychological effects of swaddling: it is a contentious subject. But one's confidence is weakened by Soranus's complaints about mothers and nurses who – out of reluctance, he thinks, to do the washing – leave the baby's limbs free, and give him lots of baths, and feed and cuddle him just because he cries. (Mothers and nurses cannot win. R. thinks poorly of child-care by women who 'were obliged to carry out other work between the child's feeds', p. 61).

Psychohistory is always problematic. We do not know enough about actual child-care: theories of child-care are instructive about social attitudes (see Christina Hardyment, *Dream Babies*, 1983) but need not match reality even in the class which knew about them. Likewise, it is illuminating to know which 'diseases' come to the forefront; but doctors, inevitably, see people who have cause for concern, and probably remember most vividly the ones who fit or disprove interesting theories. So R. does not give a full explanation (what could count as one?) of the phenomenon of asceticism. Her great contribution is to illustrate what seemed possible, and desirable, to those who opted for it.

Review: H. D. Jocelyn (Manchester)

LCM 14.6 (Jun.1989), 92-96

Theodorus Gaza. M. Tullii Ciceronis liber De senectute in Graecum translatus. Edidit Ioannes Salanitro, Leipzig, BSB B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft 1987 (*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*), pp. xxvi, 146. Cloth, DM 54. ISBN 3-322-00360-4.

Theodore Gaza's translation of Cicero's dialogue *De senectute* circulated widely in Italy during the fifteenth century. It found readers not only among the established Greek-speakers of the South and those who had, like Gaza himself, fled from Asia Minor and the motherland in the face of the Turks but also among Italian-speakers interested in the Greek language and in Greek culture. Some eighteen manuscripts made during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries carry the work either alone or in the company of other Greek writings. The Bodleian Library's Barocci 165 has it with original philosophical works emanating from the circle of Gaza's chief patron, the Greek cardinal Bessarion. G.B. Egnazio printed it, apparently from cod. Paris, B.N.Gr. 2071, in an appendix to the 1517 Aldine edition of the *De officiis*, *De senectute*, *De amicitia*, *Paradoxa* and *Somnium Scipionis*. Western European students of classical literature continued to find it interesting throughout the seventeenth century. Egnazio's text was accordingly reproduced a number of times in various printing houses. Items of Gaza's vocabulary even entered Robert Estienne's *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*. J.A. Goez made a fresh edition in 1801 from the same Paris manuscript. So too did P.C. Hess in 1833, adding, however, a number of variant readings from cod. Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Gr. 289.

Giovanni Salanitro has sought out all the manuscripts now known to carry the translation and discovered in one of them, cod. Zürich, Zentralbibliothek C 136, a version different at many points from that in cod. Paris, B. N. Gr. 2071 and the rest (see *RIL* 109 [1975], 284-96; *Helikon* 16-17 [1975-76], 319-50; *Sileno* 3 [1977], 201-6). The Zürich version struck him at first as more concise, more literal and more complete than the other, and consequently the product of second thoughts on Gaza's part. Enrica Follieri has stated twice without argument (*Byz. Zeitschr.* 71 [1978], 141; 74 [1981], 126) that the opposite must be the case. Salanitro has not changed his mind but prints the two versions side by side with a full apparatus underneath each. He adds a 23-page commentary treating the passages where the paradosis has brought corruption, where a variant of the Ciceronian text otherwise unknown seems to be presupposed by the translation, where the translation arguably supports the right side in a textual quarrel, where Gaza's intent is obscure, where Cicero has been misinterpreted or thought to have been misinterpreted, and where the two versions differ significantly. There are two indexes, one listing the items of Gaza's vocabulary and the Latin words they translate, the other the items of Cicero's vocabulary and the Greek words with which Gaza translates them. The preface deals succinctly with the life, writings and posthumous reputation of Gaza, the manuscripts and printed editions of the translation of the *De senectute*, the question of the status of the Zürich variants, and the character of the manuscript of the *De senectute* used for the translation. An extensive bibliography sensibly articulated completes the offering.

Salanitro makes a number of claims about the value of Gaza's work for the student of the *De senectute* which will raise eye-brows. These claims did not, however, have to be made, and the value of Salanitro's labours is not diminished if they cannot be substantiated. Let us therefore get them out of the way before we consider the indubitably positive contribution offered by his edition of Gaza's work.

450 manuscripts containing the *De senectute* survive from the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. None of those hitherto studied (see J. G. F. Powell, 'Cicero Maior de senectute' in L. D. Reynolds ed., *Texts and Transmission*, Oxford 1983, 120, *Cicero: Cato maior de senectute. Edited with Introduction and Commentary*, Cambridge 1988, 44) seems to be the one used by Gaza. Editors of the *De senectute* work with the copious and already heavily contaminated older tradition and ignore the younger. Salanitro claims (p. xvii; cf. *GIF* 20 [1967], 291-8, n.s.10 [1979], 130-37, *SicGymn* 21 [1968], 76-93, *Helikon* 9-10 [1969-70], 622-31) that Gaza's manuscript carried some unique 'good' readings both in its base text and in its marginalia. The less than literal method of translation followed by Gaza

makes it very difficult to nail down outright novelties. Salanitro himself admits that Gaza could on his own account have filled out 3 *et saepe dicemus* (*καὶ εἰσαῦθις ἔροῦμεν πολλάκις*), 4 *eandem accusant adeptam* (*κτησάμενοι δὲ τοῦτο πάλιν αὐτὸν αἰτιῶνται*), 7 *faciam* (*ποιήσω δὴ τοῦτο*), 10 *comitate condita grauitas* (*σεμνότης ἐκ φιλοφροσύνης εὖ μάλα ἡδυομένη*), 34 *sed ne quantum possumus quidem cogimur* (*ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ ὥν ἐν δυνάμει ἔσμεν πράττειν δναγκαζόμεθα*), 52 *fertur ad terram* (*ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καταφερομένη*), 57 *quid de pratorum uiriditate* (*τί δὲ τοῦ τῶν λειμῶνων εὔχλωρου καὶ εὔανθδος πέρι / τί δ’ αὖ λειμῶνων χλωρότητος πέρι καὶ εὔανθλας*), 71 *decidunt* (*εὔπετῶς καταπίπτουσι*), and curtailed 9 *i n omni aetate cultae* (*καλῶς διὰ βίου ἐκπονθεῖσαι*), 11 *glorianti atque ita dicenti* (*σεμνυμομένῳ καὶ λέγοντι*). 26 *καθάπερ Σόλωνα ἐκλαμπρυνόμενον ἔπεσιν δρῶμεν... οἶον τι κάγω πεποιηκα*. . . looks to me like an attempt by Gaza himself to deal with *ut et Solonem uersibus gloriantem uidemus... ut ego feci* (Madvig settled the problem by altering the second *ut* to *et*). 28 *ἔστι καὶ γάρ αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐπιτίθεμα οὐ μόνον ἀγχινόλας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλευρῶν εὐτονίας / καὶ λσχόνος καὶ νῆ Δία εὐήχου φωνῆς supplements est enim munus eius non ingenii solum, sed laterum etiam et uirium* from the following sentence. 31 *ὡς παρ’ Ὄμηρον Νέστωρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λσχύννη πολλάκις ὑμνεῖ* was written in the light of what the Homeric Nestor actually says (Gaza knew Homer intimately; the calligraphic copy of the *Iliad* he made for Filelfo is preserved in the Laurentian Library as gr. xxxii. 1) rather than Cicero's *ut apud Homerum saepissime Nestor de uirtutibus suis praedicet*. 53 *τὸν τοῦ ἥλιου λσχυρὸν καύσωνα διαφεύγει* (*≠ nimios solis defendit ardores*) evidences no more than Gaza's perplexity at Cicero's slightly uncommon use of *defendere* (in the sense of *ἀμύνειν* rather than *φυλάττειν*). 56 *Λευκίω Κινέντω Κινκιντό τῷ* (*≠ Lucio Quintio Cincinnato*) and 69 *Ἄργανθώνιός τις Τουρδητανός* (*≠ Arganthonius quidam Gadibus*) suggest semi-conscious conjecture on Gaza's part rather than objective features of his exemplar. 56 *οὐ κατὰ γε γνάμην ἐμήν, οὐκ οὖδα, εἰ τις βίος εἴη τούτου μακαριώτερος, οὐ μόνον...* (*≠ mea quidem sententia haud scio an nulla beatior possit esse; neque solum ...*) shows a typically Greek collocation of negatives; there is no need at all to suppose that Gaza's exemplar differed from those we know. 58 *οὐκοῦν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἵππους ἔχοντων, σφίσιν δπλα, σφίσιν ἀκόντια...* (*≠ sibi habeant igitur arma, sibi equos, sibi hastas*) reflects Gaza's own judgment on the relative importance of the items listed. Nothing at all can be deduced from 24 *ἄττα αἰῶνα ἔτερον γ’ δύνησει* except that Gaza recognised no poetic rhythm in *quae alteri saecula prosint*. It is easier to fix cases where the translation points to a variant already known; e.g. 12 *τὴν τελευτὴν ... Μάρκου τοῦ νίέος ≠ mortem M. filii, 18 δπως... ἐποίσομεν πόλεμον ≠ quomodo... bellum inferatur, 35 συναιρέτεον ≠ compescenda, 41 οὗτω βδελυρόν ... οὗτω θανατηφόρον ≠ tam detestabile tamque pestiferum, 70 σοφῷ ≠ sapienti, 71 βίᾳ ≠ ui, l* (although hardly 28 *εὐπρεπῆς ἔστιν ... εύσύνθετος ... ἐπιστέλλειν γε μήν Σκιπίωνι ... τί γάρ ≠ decorus est ... compositus ... praecipere Scipioni ... quid enim, 29 τῷ γήρᾳ παρέδωκε ≠ senectuti tradit, 65 ηθούς κακίαι ≠ moris uitia). Knowledge of such cases nevertheless does not help the critic of the Ciceronian text in the slightest. The number of witnesses to a variant is irrelevant.*

Whether Gaza had learnt any Latin before he was forced to flee Salonica we do not know. An interest in Latin literature had appeared in the East in the second half of the thirteenth-century and continued to flicker in the fourteenth. Gaza taught Greek for a period in the school of Vittorino da Feltre in Mantua. Here he would have found a level of Latinity as high as anywhere in the Italy of the time and an enormous enthusiasm for the writings of Cicero. His fellows in Vittorino's school were men of the stamp of Giovanni Andrea de' Bussi, Lorenzo Valla and Niccold Perotti. Between 1451 and 1455 he produced in Rome for Pope Nicholas V a series of translations of Greek technical works which won great acclaim both for accuracy and Latinity. Where he made his translations of Cicero's *De officiis*, *D e amicitia* and *D e senectute* (that of the *Somnium Scipionis*, frequently attributed to him, appears to be the work of the thirteenth-century Byzantine Planudes) is quite unclear. These too won acclaim for accuracy, elegance and Attic correctness of language. Ability to write

elegant Latin of the kind the generality of the Italian humanists admired is not, however, always necessarily accompanied by a profound understanding of real Latin texts. Two very acute Latinists, the Italian Politian and the Frenchman Joseph Scaliger, who admired Gaza as one of the great men of the mid-fifteenth century, nevertheless made damaging criticisms of the *De senectute* translation. Salanitro admits that the translation hitherto known did frequently misinterpret the original but urges that the Zürich version corrects at least some of the errors. He defends Gaza against a number of the particular assaults made on him, and finds him right on various points of still disputed interpretation. His examination of the witnesses to the commonly known version shows that many errors belong to the paradosis rather than to Gaza himself. Salanitro's argumentation is always intelligent. Nevertheless his enthusiasm sometimes carries him away. In his commentary he flatly contradicts Politian's charge that 50 δν 'Εννιος 'μελγηρων' δρθότατα δνομάζει misinterprets *quem recte 'Suadae medullam' dixit Ennius*. In his article in *Studi di poesia latina in onore di Antonio Traglia*, Rome 1979, 69-71, he pointed out, rightly enough, that Gaza had in mind an earlier part of the passage of the *Annales* being quoted by the Ciceronian Cato, a passage cited more fully by Cicero in his discussion of M. Cornelius Cethegus at *Brut.* 57-60. But this does not clear Gaza of the charge of misunderstanding Ennius' Latin, however one redefines 'translation'. Ennius described Cethegus as *suauiloquenti ore* and then cited the *populares* of Cethegus' time as calling him *flos delibatus populi* and *Suadai* (or *Suadas*) *medulla*. The best that may be said for Gaza is that he could not understand *Suadai medulla* (which the Ciceronian Cato chose to quote because it was the strongest of the three eulogies) and put down something comprehensible to his readers, appropriately poetical in tone, and not utterly nonsensical in the context.

The notion is frequently to be found in Salanitro's commentary that, if Gaza translates it, this is a point in favour of the paradosis. In fact Gaza's tolerance of what he found in his exemplar is neither here nor there when it comes to considering 10 *deinde aedilis quadriennio post factus sum praetor, 12 externa bella, 15 fere omnibus, 20 in Naeuii poetae ludo, 24 omittamus, 28 senis sermo, 33 bouem uiuum, 46 a summo magistro 49 mori... in studio, 51 dein tepefactum uapore et compressu suo diffundit, 76 extrema quaedam studia*. The editor has to use his own brains in each case. A man able to swallow 51 *semen...* *occatum* or 83 *neque uero eos solos conuenire habeo quos ipse cognoui* cannot serve as a philological guide.

While it remains debatable how far Gaza's translation can really help the students of the *De senectute* itself, those interested in the history of Greek culture ought to pay more attention than they have done. The work comes from the beginning of that murky but grimly instructive period during which no centre of political power was held by habitual users of the Greek language. It relates in some way to an area where Greek settlements of great antiquity had been replenished a number of times throughout the Middle Ages, and where many Greek-speaking refugees found homes in the course of the fifteenth century. Gaza finished his days abbot of the monastery of San Giovanni a Piro, and some of the codices carrying the *De senectute* translation seem to have had South Italian owners. Many scholars, including Salanitro himself (see p. VI and cf. *Helikon* 15-16 [1975-6], 346-7 n. 22, 348 n. 26), have treated Gaza's work on Cicero as narrowly didactic in nature, as aimed primarily at Italian-speakers seeking to acquire Greek in addition to Latin. That, I think, pushes the material out of perspective and limits unduly the range of questions which might be put to it.

The question of the influence of Latin culture upon Greek does not have the same abiding interest as does that of the influence of Greek upon Latin and Western European culture. It must nevertheless excite a degree of curiosity. Some native-speakers of Greek, of course, set themselves to learn Latin at a very early period, indeed as soon as the money-making opportunities offered by the expansion of Rome's power became apparent, but the land-owning aristocracies of the cities of mainland, island and Asiatic Greece never bothered. At least some individual aristocrats who entered the Roman senate did acquire a good reading

knowledge of Latin, but these preferred to write in their native Greek. The intelligentsia of the Eastern half of the developed Empire took little interest in Latin literature. Ammianus and Claudius belong, like Livius Andronicus, to the history of the culture of Rome. It is of course fashionable to detect an awareness of Augustan and even later Latin poetry among the Greek poets of fifth-century Egypt, but other explanations of the phenomena remain not totally exploded. The attempt to keep Latin as the language of the court at Constantinople petered out in the course of the sixth century. Even the army came to adopt Greek. It was the effort of the Franks, Venetians and other Western Christians in the late Middle Ages to establish themselves in the East and the growing menace of the Muslim Turks that impelled Greeks for the first time to look seriously at both the religious and the secular culture of the West. St. Thomas' theological writings were followed into the Greek language by Ovid's *erotica*. Native Greek culture did not come to a sudden end with the fall of Constantinople. Gaza's translations of Cicero's ethical dialogues, works enormously admired in mid-fifteenth-century Italy, should be seen as an effort to interest his fellow Greeks in their substance, and thus to promote an understanding of the people upon whose power the very survival of anything that could be called Greek seemed to depend.

These translations did not stand alone. Gaza also turned into Greek two scientific treatises composed by a colleague of his days at the D'Este court in Ferrara, the physician Michele Savonarola. His grammar of the classical form of the Greek language, first printed in 1485 along with works of the ancient grammarians Apollonius and Herodian, set out to instruct native Greeks well advanced in literary studies, even if it was destined later to find many users in the schools of Italian-speaking cities. His philosophical essays addressed current controversies among Greeks.

Many particularities of the *De senectute* translation reveal clearly a Greek writing for Greeks. Amusing is the way the vulgate form turns the Ciceronian Cato's praise of the funeral speech Quintus Fabius Maximus made about his son, *12 est in manibus laudatio, quam cum legimus, quem philosophum non contemnimus?*, with διὰ χειρὸς δὲ ἡμῖν τὸ ἔγκωμιον, δπερ ἀναγνώσκοντες τίνα οὐχ ὑπερφρονοῦμεν τῶν ἐκ τρίβωνος φιλοσόφων; Gaza's milieu would not have fathomed a total rejection of philosophy. A similar piece of Catonic anti-intellectualism at 84, *non libet enim mihi deplorare uitam, quod multi et ei docti saepe fecerunt*, becomes οὐ γάρ τοι φίλον ἔμοι ὀλοφύρεσθαι τὸν βίον / τὸν βίον δδύρεσθαι, δ πολλοὶ δι' ἀπαιδευσάν πολλάκις φάνονται δεδρακότες / ἔδρασαν. Here, however, it should be confessed that Gaza's exemplar could have read *multi et indocti*. The over-all sexual orientation of the milieu perhaps shows in the turning of 50 *quae sunt igitur epularum aut ludorum aut scortorum uoluptates cum his uoluptatibus comparandae?* with τίνας οὖν εύωχιῶν ή δγώνων θεῶν ή παιδικῶν ήδονᾶς δξιον ταῖς ήδοναῖς ταυταισὶ παραβάλλειν;

Other features of the translation indicate a desire to interest readers in what Cicero has to say as much as to interpret exactly his actual words. It is true that he rarely abandons the sentence structure of the *De senectute* (cf., however, 84 τί γάρ σύμφορον ἔχει δ βίος; τί δοι οὐ μᾶλλον ἐπίπονον; εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ ἔχετω πι, δλλ' ἔχει δῆπον καὶ εἴτε κόρον εἴτε μέτρον δέοι καλεῖν = *quid habet enim uita commodi? quid non potius laboris? sed habeat sane, habet certe tamen aut satietatem aut modum*). On the other hand he avoids outright Latinisms (e.g. 46 *cum uestra etiam aetate* becomes μετὰ τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ; 47 *d i meliora εύφημει*; 53 *existit tamquam ad articulos sarmentorum ea quae gemma dicitur* ἀσπερ ὑπὸ μέτωπα τῶν κλημάτων ἀνέψειν δ καλούμενος δφθαλμός), he adds words for the sake of clarity or rhetorical balance (e.g. 51 *nixa fibris stirpium* becomes φιζίοις προσρυεῖσθαι καὶ παγεῖσα) and he drops material seemingly irrelevant to the argument (e.g. *Centone Tuditanoque consulibus* at 50). His choice of words was praised by Filelfo and others as 'Attic' in quality. Scaliger, on the other hand, declared that the Greek of the *De senectute* translation was no model for anyone trying to write Greek correctly. Hess catalogued in a haughty manner a large number of Gazean words and usages absent from the record of 'classical' Greek. The crudity of such judgements is obvious, but those who

made them were aware of a real problem: how did the Greek of the *De senectute* translation relate on the one hand to the kinds of Greek actually used in Gaza's milieu and on the other to those of the ancient authors admired there? Salanitro is certainly aware of the problem (cf. his article in *Sileno* 3 [1977], 201-6) but makes only a few glances at it in his commentary. Difficult as the problem is, however, it has to be faced by anyone seriously concerned with Gaza's work. The man from Salonica was extremely sensitive to distinctions of style. In translating Aristotle and Theophrastus for Pope Nicholas he turned his back on the prevailing pan-Ciceronianism of the mid-fifteenth century and sought more appropriate models in Celsus, Columella and Pliny. It is unlikely that, in translating what purported to be the private discourse of an elder statesman, he would have used as any sort of model the public orations of Demosthenes, the Athenian Cicero. The essays of Plutarch, which we know him to have admired, offered more obvious assistance. A very large question is open. Likewise many particular ones: where, for example, if anywhere, did Gaza find the words *εύκατάπτωτος* (5, 52), *εύσχημονολογεῖν* (50), *οἰνωρεῖον*, *έλαιωρεῖον*, *μελιττωρεῖον*, *δψωρεῖον* (56), *εύανθια* (57), *εύλογιον* (73)?

The hitherto unknown version which Salanitro presents and analyses so well offers a fascinating look into Gaza's stylistic workshop. If we knew whether it preceded or followed the one which the Aldine press made known, discussion of Gaza's Greek would be somewhat easier. Unfortunately, no answer to this question is likely to meet with universal approval. Where the two versions differ, it is usually a question of manner rather than of substance. Salanitro reaffirms (pp. xiv-xv) his initial view that the Zürich manuscript carries a later revision of the original translation. He lists seventeen passages of his new text which seem to him to be more 'correct'. If these seventeen variants are set against all those which cannot be called more 'correct' or which are arguably less 'correct' (e.g. particularly 5 *ἐπὶ τῶν ἀκροδρύων καὶ τῶν ἐκ γῆς σπερμάτων* (= *καρπῶν*) = *in arborum bacis terraeque fructibus*; 26 *χαλεπόν τε καὶ ἀπρακτὸν* (= *χαλαρόν ... καὶ ἀργόν*) = *languida atque iners*), their over-all significance diminishes greatly. In most cases, moreover, the vulgate reading could be plausibly regarded as an attempt to improve the Greekness and stylistic effectiveness of the Zürich version, even if at the cost of literal exactitude. Where it lacks a word (i.e. at 3, 13, 56, 78) or has an extra one (i.e. at 4, 7, 70, 77), textual corruption could also be invoked. The general nonsense thrown up by the Zürich manuscript at 1, *ἄπερ Ἐννιος πρὸς Φλαμίνιον λέγει, ἐπὶ πράγματι μὲν κεῖνος δὲ ἀνήρ οὐ πάνυ μεγάλῳ, ἔμπλως δὲ τοι πόστεως ἀν,* debars discussion of the individual variant *λέγει* (= *εἶρηκεν*). Only 13 τὸν *Πανηγυρικὸν* (= *Παναθηναϊκὸν*) *ἐπιγραφόμενον λόγον* and 44 *ἡδετο γὰρ θαμινὰ λαμπάδι τε καὶ αὐλῷ ≠ αὐλητῇ* make real difficulties for the view that it is the vulgate manuscripts which present Gaza's revision. These difficulties seem to me to be small ones.

When all is weighed up we can whole-heartedly welcome an addition to the '*Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana*' which brings into the public domain fresh information about a little known text set out with care and good sense. Too many items of this series offer no more than a display of editorial whimsy in regard to material already worked over to excess by twentieth-century scholarship. Salanitro should be thanked for his labours and encouraged to bring out in similar form all Gaza's other Greek writings. The lineaments of a figure of the fifteenth century whom Scaliger ranked with Politian and Pico della Mirandola will then stand out more clearly.